And it had the fortuitous timing to start its reforms as globalization went into overdrive, making it easier to integrate the country into complex supply chains and thereby make China the workshop of the world.

China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and other resources. China seemed to have hit the demographic jackpot in the 1980s and 1990s the unlikely combination of warfare and famine in the 1930s and 1940s, a regime-sponsored baby boom after the CCP took power, and then the institution of the one-child policy in 1980 left the country with a huge working-age population unencumbered by lots of young or old dependents. That growth enabled the decades-long military buildup and sprawling economic influence that made China a force to be feared on the global stage.Īs Tufts University’s Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China, this economic miracle required good luck and good policy. From 1978 to the onset of the global financial crisis three decades later, China’s constant-dollar GDP grew by a factor of 17, without the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) losing control. A few prominent analysts made careers for themselves by heralding China’s collapse. officials predicted that China could be rich or autocratic-but not both. Through the early 2000s, social scientists and U.S. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it was common to wonder whether the resulting political crackdown would stifle the country’s prosperity. diplomat George Kennan once called a “vast poorhouse”-could put together the policies necessary for sustained growth. In the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s death, some Western observers were skeptical that China-a country that U.S. In recent decades, Beijing has repeatedly confounded those who predicted it was about to hit the wall. That could be the worst possible combination for the world.Īny country that rises as impressively as China is bound to make fools of some prophets of decline along the way. The China of the 2020s will be a country whose coercive capabilities are more intimidating than ever as its economic dynamism fades. And today, for reasons including demographic disaster and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is facing the end of the stunning economic growth that made it possible for Xi to assert that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” was at hand. Yet military power is often a lagging indicator of a country’s trajectory: It takes time to turn money into military muscle, and massive buildups often persist even after a country’s economic fortunes begin to flag. When Xi declares that “the East is rising and the West is declining,” he gives voice to this sense that China is a country on the make.

In some ways, China is still soaring: Its military power grows more formidable every year.

Its spectacular growth challenged prevailing views about the sources of national success in the modern world. Since the onset of its economic reforms in the 1970s, China has long defied predictions that it would soon stumble or collapse. Xi Jinping’s China is about to give the world an education in the nuances of decline. Read more stories from the issue, and subscribe to support our journalism. THE CHINA ISSUE: This article appears in the Spring 2022 print magazine. And decline doesn’t always lead a country to scale back its objectives-the sense of urgency it creates can cause ambitious powers to grab what they can before the clock runs out. It can be surging forward in some areas, such as military might, even as its underlying economic strength starts to wither. But a country can be in relative decline vis-à-vis a fast-growing adversary even if its own power is still increasing. The term makes us think of a country that is falling like a rock-one whose power and capabilities are dropping across the board.

The fall and decline of race into space